Activism
Belarus still lives in a personalist regime, where Alexander Lukashenko is not just the head of state, but the core of the entire system. But the system is aging. And along with it—its creator.
What will happen when Lukashenko disappears—physically or politically? Who actually rules the country in his shadow? And most importantly—who will the entire structure collapse upon after his departure?
Read in the new Nottoday text—about the five circles of power, two transit scenarios, and one unanswered question: is the system ready for its own end?
Text: Nottoday Editorial
Source: Center for New Ideas, adapted and reinterpreted
The system was built for one person. But the person is aging. The system is too.
Belarus has long lived by the logic of a personalist regime: the vertical, the siloviki (security forces), the budget—everything is tied to one person. And as long as he is alive, the system holds. But even the strongest structures crumble when the one who held the key disappears.
What will happen when Lukashenko leaves? Who will take power? And is the system itself ready for life without its architect?
Two scenarios: voluntary or accidental
Controlled Transit
Lukashenko chooses a successor himself. It could be a son, a security official, or a bureaucrat. He himself moves into the shadows—into the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly or even deeper. But the system remains almost unchanged.
System Failure
Lukashenko disappears suddenly: death, a coup, a crisis, Moscow. In this case, the ruling class will save themselves however they can. And the country will open up to chaos.
Which scenario is more likely? Logic suggests the first. Belarusian reality suggests the second.
The Five Circles of Power: Who they are
Research by the Center for New Ideas identifies five nuclear groups that constitute power in Belarus today. There is no consensus among them. They are united by one thing—dependence on the regime and fear of its collapse.
The First Circle. The Family
This is not a metaphor. This is literally relatives. Primarily—Viktor Lukashenko. His removal from the post of national security advisor in 2021 gave rise to rumors of a conflict with his father. But there is no real evidence.
What is important: only a son can guarantee full loyalty. Only he might be acceptable to the Kremlin. Only he can inherit the system without a shock.
The Second Circle. The Administrative Vertical
These are bureaucrats who grew up inside the regime. There are many of them. They fear change. They have no ambitions, but they can support anyone who ensures predictability. Their task is to continue.
The Third Circle. Economic Technocrats
Younger, smarter, more mobile. These people think pragmatically. For them, stability is more important than the system itself. They are ready for cautious transformation. And it is possible that the “transition manager” will emerge from this group.
The Fourth Circle. The Siloviki (Security Forces)
They are not just a service. This is real power. The Presidential Security Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB, the General Prosecutor’s Office. They listen to everyone. They appoint. They hold. Since 2020—even more so.
The siloviki are not interested in reform. They are interested in preserving privileges. And in the absence of a trial.
The Fifth Circle. Business Close to the Body
These are the directors of state giants: Belaruskali, BelAZ, oil refineries. They are not free, but they are influential. In the regions, they are often more important than governors. Their priority is the status quo. They can be partners of a new regime—if it lets them work.
They don’t dream of democracy. They fear the future.
No one in today’s ruling class is leading Belarus to freedom. Not because they have malicious intent. But because they have no other political map. For them, democracy is not an alternative, but a threat. Not a path, but chaos. Not a chance, but a risk of losing everything.
They grew up in a system where power is not service, but security. Where loyalty is more valuable than competence. Where any dissent is suspicion. Where to live is to survive. And when you live like this for decades, any talk of a “new Belarus” sounds like talk of your death—political, social, and possibly physical.
The ruling class does not want change. It wants to preserve itself
It wants everything to stay as it is—or at least not get worse. So that the “new ones” don’t come and ask: “What were you doing from 2020 to 2024?” So they don’t have to explain why they remained silent when people were being beaten. Why they signed orders. Why they received apartments at the budget’s expense. Why they called all of this “service.”
They are not building the future. They fear being in it
Because any future is a revision. And any revision is a threat. They don’t need the new.
They need a continuation of the old—in a slightly modified form.
Let there be a different leader, let the facade change, let a referendum be held. The main thing is that they themselves are not touched. Their positions. Their influence. Their past.
That is why this system can transform, but not reform. It can adapt, but not change from within. It is incapable of giving birth to democracy—because it was not born for it.
And if something changes tomorrow, they will not be the builders of a new country—but its most cautious passengers.
What the system truly fears
From the outside, it seems the system is monolithic. It speaks with one voice, acts without hesitation, leaves no trace of doubt. But inside—it’s different. Inside—there is fear. And each circle of power has its own.
The siloviki fear a tribunal
They know what they did. They know whose orders they carried out. Since 2020, they have become not just the pillars of the regime—they have become its hands. Repression, searches, torture, deportations—all this will remain in archives and testimonies. They understand: the fall of the regime could mean Nuremberg. Or the Hague. Or at least revenge from those who are silent today. Therefore, their task is to prevent change at any cost. Even if they have to become the regime themselves.
Bureaucrats fear being fired
They are not ideologues. They are not military. They are performers. For them, power is a position, an office, a schedule, a canteen. They are built into the system and do not know how to live outside of it. If the system disappears—they disappear too. They have nothing to offer the world outside the vertical. Therefore, their fear is remaining a “nobody.” Without a position, without status, without purpose.
Technocrats fear chaos
They think rationally. For them, the ideal regime is predictable. Without ideology, but with a budget and a course. They are not against reforms—but only cautious ones. Not against change—but not a revolution. They are afraid that instead of a managed transit, a collapse will begin where there will be no room for competence. Where the siloviki will win again. Or the street crowd. Or Moscow.
Business fears confiscations
State capitalism Belarusian-style is a deal: you are loyal—you are allowed to work. Break a rule—lose everything. Therefore, big business has learned to have no views. But it is still vulnerable. If the regime collapses—new ones will come. With new laws. With new interests. And no one promises that the former owners will have anything left. Not even the land under the factory.
The Family fears revenge
This is Lukashenko’s closest circle. His son, his people, his history. They understand: if the system collapses, they are the ones who will become the symbols of the past. And symbols are not spared. They are not judged—they are burned. They are taken revenge upon publicly. To close the chapter. Therefore, their fear is not for power, but for physical survival.
Today, these fears hold the system together. But the seams are already cracking. More and more often—in private conversations, in backroom signals, in resignations and transfers—the main question sounds:
What if everything changes tomorrow?
Who could lead the country after Lukashenko?
✖ Viktor Lukashenko—a symbol of continuity, but not legitimacy.
✖ A security official—controllable, but toxic.
✖ A technocrat—a safe choice for the elite, but a stranger to the people.
✖ An outside candidate—only possible if the regime collapses.
Conclusion: not the end, but a fracture
Political transit in Belarus will not be about elections. It will be about fear, compromise, and the struggle for the surviving structure.
The collapse of the regime is not necessarily freedom. It may simply be a new form of the old dependence.
But one thing is clear: in the shadow of Lukashenko, a new reality is already forming. And who steps out into the light depends on exactly how the one who still holds the country by the throat with a bloody hand disappears.